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Julie A. Hopkins* and Thomas M. Joraanstad**

Challenge-Flag Thrown: The Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board’s Cancellation of the Redskins’
Trademarks and Pro-Football’s Chances on Appeal

“As long as I own this football team and long after I’m gone, they will always be the
Washington Redskins.” – Jack Kent Cooke, former owner, Washington Redskins1
“We’ll never change the name. It’s that simple. NEVER – you can use caps.” –
Daniel Snyder, Washington Redskins Owner2

I. Introduction
On a chilly afternoon in December, one hundred activists gathered, chanted,
and marched outside of FedEx Field in Landover, Maryland, home of the
Washington Redskins football team.3 This was the largest protest at a Washington
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home game, and the last of a disappointing season for the team.4 Demonstrators,
including many Native Americans, urged fans to “Rethink,” “Replace,” and
“Rename.”5 The protestors chanted, “We are people, not your mascots.”6 Some fans
ignored them, many more shouted back “Hail to the Redskins” and other far less
printable responses.7 The protest was one in a series of recent attempts to bring
awareness to the issue and reflects the ongoing desire of many Native Americans,
and increasingly the public at large, for the Washington football team to change its
name.8
As the debate over whether the team should change its name continues to be
played out at football stadiums, in living rooms, and in the media, the ongoing legal
battle to cancel the football team’s trademarks begins its next chapter. Recently, in a
2–1 decision by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the “TTAB”), and for the
second time, the TTAB granted a petition to cancel the REDSKINS trademarks
under a little used provision of federal law that allows a registered trademark to be
cancelled if the trademark is perceived to be disparaging to a substantial composite
of the referenced group—in this case, Native Americans.9 The TTAB, relying on
much of the same evidence from the first cancellation proceedings, agreed with the
petitioners that the term redskin(s) is disparaging to Native Americans.10
Despite this victory for proponents of the name change, the fight is not over. The
owner of the six cancelled trademarks, Pro-Football, Inc. (“Pro-Football”), has filed
an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (the
“Eastern District”) to overturn the TTAB’s decision.11 Considering the flaws of the
major pieces of evidence relied on by petitioners and the TTAB in making its
decision, and considering further how similar evidence and reasoning was treated
by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (the “D.C. Circuit”)
in a previous and nearly identical action, it seems possible, if not likely, that the
Court will find that the Blackhorse petitioners are unable to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the marks are disparaging as perceived by
Native Americans, and thus the TTAB’s decision to cancel the trademarks is not

4.

Id.
Id.
6. Id. Elsewhere, fans of the name chanted, “keep the name.” Chris Lingebach, ‘Keep the Name’ Chant
Drowns Out Dan Snyder at Redskins Rally in Houston, CBS DC (Sept. 6, 2014, 11:16 PM), http://washington.cbsl
ocal.com/2014/09/06/keep-the-name-chant-drowns-out-dan-snyder-at-redskins-rally-in-houston/.
7. Cox, supra note 3.
8. See id.
9. U.S. Patent Office Rules ‘Redskins’ Name Disparaging, Cancels Trademarks, CBS DC (June 18, 2014, 1:04
PM), http://washington.cbslocal.com/2014/06/18/u-s-patent-office-cancels-six-trademarks-for-washington-red
skins/ [hereinafter U.S. Patent Office Rules].
10. Id.
11. Andrew Zajac, NFL’s Redskins Appeal Ruling that Team Name is Offensive, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 15, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/20140814/redskinsappealboardrulingthatteamnameisdisparaging.html.
5.
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supported by substantial evidence.12 If the Eastern District reaches this conclusion,
the TTAB decision must be reversed, and the marks will remain registered.13
In order to understand the current legal battle over the Redskin(s) trademarks, it
is necessary to understand issues beyond the current legal proceedings. Initially, the
history of Native American imagery and names as athletic team nicknames and
mascots will be discussed, as well as efforts to curb and eliminate the use of such
nicknames and mascots.14 After a brief, but essential outline of the common law and
statutory roots of trademark protection in the United States, the Article will address
trademark cancellation proceedings generally.15 Next, a look at Section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act, and the related jurisprudence involving “scandalous” and
“disparaging” marks will demonstrate the roots of the legal framework the TTAB
used in its recent ruling.16 The first cancellation proceeding, the “Harjo Litigation,”
and the second cancellation proceeding, the “Blackhorse Litigation,” will be
subsequently explained in detail.17 Finally, this Article will analyze the likelihood
that the TTAB’s decision in the Blackhorse Litigation will be upheld or reversed on
appeal.18 As will be shown, if the Eastern District adopts the same approach as the
D.C. Circuit in the Harjo Litigation, which seems likely, the TTAB decision will be
reversed in the current action.19

II. Background
A. Native American Names as Athletic Team Nicknames and Mascots
American sports teams at all levels have a long history of using Native American
names and imagery in team names, logos, and mascots.20 For example, in 1912, the
Boston Beaneaters, now the Atlanta Braves, changed its name to the Boston Braves,
becoming one of the first professional teams to use a Native American term as its
name.21 Numerous professional and collegiate level sports teams followed suit,
adopting similar names.22 The popularity of Native American terms for team
12.

See infra Part IV.
See Zajac, supra note 11.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part II.B–C.
16. See infra Part III.A–B.
17. See infra Part III.C–D.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. Brief for Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 16, Harjo v. ProFootball, Inc., 558 U.S. 1025 (2009) (No. 09-326) [hereinafter NCAI Brief] (estimating that over 3,000 middle
school, high school, colleges, and universities at one time used Native American mascots and nicknames).
21. J. Gordon Hylton, Before the Redskins Were the Redskins: The Use of Native American Team Names in
the Formative Era of American Sports, 1857–1933, 86 N.D. L. REV. 879, 896–97 (2010).
22. NCAI Brief, supra note 20, at 16.
13.
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mascots and nicknames skyrocketed in the early twentieth century, with, at its peak,
over 3,000 high school, college, and professional teams using Native American
mascots or nicknames.23 In 1963, the Dallas Texans relocated to Kansas City and
were renamed the Chiefs, the last professional sports team to adopt a Native
American mascot.24 Today, several professional teams still use such names.25
In response to this trend and other negative portrayals of Native Americans in
the media, in 1968, the National Congress of American Indians (the “NCAI”)
established an official campaign “to bring an end to negative and harmful
stereotypes [of Native Americans] in the media and popular culture.”26 Over the
ensuing decades, efforts by Native American groups and changing public attitudes27
towards Native American mascots and imagery have changed the mascot landscape.
In 2005, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) stated it would no
longer allow the use of Native American mascots or nicknames in its postseason
tournaments, simultaneously issuing a list of eighteen schools with “hostile or
abusive” mascots and nicknames.28 Myles Brand, the president of the NCAA stated,
“as a national association, we believe that mascots, nicknames or images deemed
hostile or abusive in terms of race, ethnicity or national origin should not be visible
at the championship events that we control.”29 Following the NCAA’s lead, some

23.

See id.
NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, ENDING THE LEGACY OF RACISM IN SPORTS & THE ERA OF HARMFUL
“INDIAN” SPORTS MASCOTS 9 (2013), available at http://www.ncai.org/attachments/policypaper_mijapmouwdbj
qftjayzqwlqldrwzvsyfakbwthpmatcoroyolpn_ncai_harmful_mascots_report_ending_the_legacy_of_racism_10_
2013.pdf [hereinafter ENDING THE LEGACY].
25. This includes the Kansas City Chiefs and Washington Redskins (National Football League); the Atlanta
Braves and Cleveland Indians (Major League Baseball); and the Chicago Blackhawks (National Hockey League).
See Erik Brady, Redskins not Only Team Targeted for Indian Nickname, USA TODAY (May 5, 2014, 11:07 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2014/05/04/redskins-mascot-nickname-indians-wahoo-chiefs-blackhaw
ks-braves/8705159/.
26. ENDING THE LEGACY, supra note 24, at 2.
27. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Statement of U.S. Commission on Civil Rights on
the use of Native American Images and Nicknames as Sports Symbols (Apr. 13, 2001), available at http://www.u
sccr.gov/press/archives/2001/041601st.htm (calling for “the end of the use of Native American images and team
names” by non-Native teams).
28. Press Release, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, NCAA Executive Committee Issues Guidelines for Use of
Native American Mascots at Championship Events (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/PressArc
hive/2005/Announcements/NCAA%2BExecutive%2BCommittee%2BIssues%2BGuidelines%2Bfor%2BUse%2
Bof%2BNative%2BAmerican%2BMascots%2Bat%2BChampionship%2BEvents.html. The following nicknames
and mascots were deemed hostile and abusive: Braves, Chippewas, Seminoles, Utes, Indians, Fighting Illini,
Redmen, Choctaws, Fighting Sioux, and Savages. Id. Teams with those mascots are still allowed to participate
in the postseason tournaments and championships, but they are not allowed to wear uniforms or anything else
that shows the offending nicknames or imagery. Id.
29. Id.
24.
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states have taken similar action.30 These efforts led to a precipitous decline in the use
of such mascots,31 with less than 1,000 of the once 3,000 “Indian” references
remaining.32
This trend, however, has not been followed by the professional sports teams that
use Native American mascots and nicknames.33 Among these teams is the
Washington Redskins, who adopted the moniker “Redskins” in 1933.34 For decades,
Native American groups have pressured Washington’s owners to change the name.35
Its current owner, Daniel Snyder, like its former owner, Jack Kent Cooke,36 denies
that the term “redskin(s)” is in any way offensive and vehemently refuses to change
the name.37 In contrast, many Native American groups and individuals maintain
that the term is derogatory, disparaging, and offensive.38 After years of
30. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.134 (West 2014) (allowing school district residents to officially object
and potentially remove a Native American school nickname, logo, or mascot); Mich. St. Bd. of Educ.,
Resolution: Use of American Indian Mascots, Nicknames, and Logos (June 26, 2003), available at http://www.mich
igan.gov/documents/mascots_69612_7.res.pdf (urging all Michigan schools to remove Native American
mascots); CNN Wire Staff, Oregon bans Native American School Mascots, Images, CNN.COM (May 18, 2012,
10:37 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/18/us/oregon-native-american-mascots/ (reporting on the Oregon
State Board of Education vote that banned Oregon schools from using Native American images and mascots).
In contrast, an ongoing debate has taken place in North Dakota over whether to replace the University of North
Dakota (“UND”) nickname, the Fighting Sioux, despite the NCAA policy. The fight included a state senate bill
ordering UND to keep the name, a statewide referendum on whether to keep the name, and a lawsuit against
the NCAA. See Most Sioux Logos to Stay at UND, ESPN.COM (Sept. 26, 2012, 9:03 PM), http://espn.go.com/colle
ge-sports/story/_/id/8429126/ncaa-allows-most-north-dakota-sioux-logos-stay.
31. Of the nineteen schools cited for hostile and abusive names, at least eleven have changed or eliminated
their mascot. Ibram Rogers & Frank J. Matthews, Use of Indian Mascots Coming to an End for College Teams,
DIVERSE (June 1, 2006), http://diverseeducation.com/article/5934/.
32. ENDING THE LEGACY, supra note 24, at 6.
33. Although no professional team name has changed since 1963, the Atlanta Braves stopped using Chief
Noc-A-Homa as its mascot in 1986, but this was due to a contract dispute. See Sports People; Mascot Won’t
Return, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/19/sports/sports-people-mascot-won-t-re
turn.html. Chief Noc-A-Homa would emerge from a teepee in the outfield and dance for each Braves’ home
run. Id. The Braves caused controversy recently by bringing back the “Screaming Savage” logo on its batting
practice caps. See Kevin Kaduk, ‘Screaming Savage’ Makes Return on Braves’ Batting Practice Caps for 2013,
YAHOO! SPORTS (Dec. 27, 2012, 10:25 AM), https://ca.sports.yahoo.com/blogs/mlb-big-league-stew/screaming-s
avage-makes-return-braves-batting-practice-caps-152538767—mlb.html.
34. ENDING THE LEGACY, supra note 24, at 10.
35. Id. at 12.
36. Shapiro, supra note 1, at C7 (reporting on a conversation with Jack Kent Cooke in which Cooke denies
the offensive nature of the word Redskins).
37. Daniel Snyder Defends ‘Redskins’, ESPN.COM (Aug. 6, 2014, 9:44 AM), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/i
d/11313245/daniel-snyder-redskins-term-honor-respect (“A Redskin is a football player. A Redskin is our fans.
The Washington Redskins fan base represents honor, represents respect, represent pride. . . . it’s a positive.”
(quoting Daniel Snyder, Owner, Washington Redskins)).
38. See NCAI Brief, supra note 20, at 3–7. Twenty-three Native American advocacy groups joined the
NCAI Brief calling for the elimination of the Redskins nickname because the mark is “patently offensive,
disparaging, and demeaning and perpetrates a centuries-old stereotype.” Id. at 8.
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unsuccessfully lobbying Pro-Football, Inc.39 for a name change, seven Native
Americans filed a petition to cancel six registered trademarks containing the term
“redskin(s)” in 1992.40 This began a seventeen-year court battle (the “Harjo
Litigation”) that ended in 2009 when the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the lower court’s dismissal of the petition on laches grounds.41
B. Federal Trademark Protection
Before examining the Harjo Litigation and the current cancellation petition
proceedings involving the six marks, it is necessary to examine the Lanham Act of
1946—the basis for the cancellation proceeding, and the source of federal
trademark rights.42 Trademark rights are rooted in common law.43 The United States
utilizes a “use-based” trademark system,44 meaning that the person claiming rights
in a mark or attempting to register a mark must first have used the mark in
commerce.45 After several, largely unsuccessful attempts at a federal scheme to
regulate trademarks,46 Congress passed the Lanham Act in 1946, in part, to
encourage federal registration and centralization of trademarks.47

39. Pro-Football, Inc. is the corporation owned by Daniel Snyder that actually owns the trademarks and
the team. See Company Overview of Pro-Football, Inc., BLOOMBERG BUS., http://investing.businessweek.com/rese
arch/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=24082365 (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
40. See Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999), rev’d, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96
(D.D.C. 2003), remanded on alternative grounds, 415 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005), on remand, 567 F. Supp. 2d 46
(D.D.C. 2008), aff’d on laches ground, 565 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
41. Id. The Harjo Litigation will be discussed in more detail later in this article. See infra Part III.C.
42. Lanham Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1051–1127 (2014)).
43. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) (“The right to adopt and use a symbol or device to
distinguish the goods or property made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by all
other persons, has long been recognized by the common law. . . . This exclusive right was not created by the act
of Congress, and does not now depend upon it for its enforcement.”). See also Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit
Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 372 (1st Cir. 1980) (“[Federal] registration does not create the underlying right in a
trademark. That right, which accrues from the use of a particular name or symbol, is essentially a common law
property right.” (citing Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795, 797 (3rd Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 847 (1949))).
44. See 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:1.25 (4th ed.
2014) [hereinafter MCCARTHY]. For a discussion on the merits of the use-based registration system, see William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987).
45. See, e.g., Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods. Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Registration does not
create a mark or confer ownership; only use in the market-place can establish a mark.”); see also 15 U.S.C. §
1051 (2014) (setting forth the requirements for federal trademark registration).
46. See Ethan Horwitz & Benjamin Levi, Fifty Years of the Lanham Act: A Retrospective of Section 43(a), 7
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 59, 60–62 (1996) (discussing the ineffectiveness of the Lanham Act’s
predecessors).
47. MCCARTHY, supra note 44, at § 19:2 (citing Bongrain Int’l (Am.) Corp. v. Delice de France, Inc., 811
F.2d 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
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The Lanham Act allows the holder of a mark to register the mark with the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).48 Although federal
registration does not create a trademark or confer ownership, a registered mark
enjoys numerous benefits including: (1) public notice of ownership of the mark;49
(2) a legal presumption of ownership of the mark and exclusive right to use the
mark nationwide or in connection with the good and services registered;50 (3) the
ability to bring actions associated with the mark in federal court;51 (4) a basis to
obtain registration in foreign countries;52 and (5) U.S. Customs protection against
the importation of infringing foreign goods.53
To register a mark with the USPTO, the claimant first files an application.54 The
application is reviewed by an examining attorney, who, among other things, ensures
that the mark is not statutorily barred from registration.55 If the examining attorney
approves the application, the mark is subsequently published for opposition in the
USPTO’s Official Gazette.56 During this thirty day period, individuals and
organizations may file oppositions challenging the mark’s registration.57 If no
opposition is filed, or filed oppositions fail, the mark is placed on the Principal
Register.58
C. Cancellation Proceedings
Although the mark may be federally registered, the propriety of the registration may
be subsequently challenged by filing a cancellation petition.59 Any individual or
organization with standing60 who wishes to cancel the mark may file a cancellation

48.

15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2014).
Id. § 1062.
50. Id. § 1057.
51. Id. § 1121.
52. Id. § 1141(a).
53. Id. § 1124.
54. Trademark Process, USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/index.jsp (last updated
Sept. 6, 2012, 5:25 PM).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1062 (2014).
59. Id. § 1064. The grounds on which a party may file a cancellation petition vary depending on whether
the petition was brought within five years of the mark’s registration. Id. This article will focus on cancellation
petitions brought after five years.
60. The issue of standing is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion on standing to challenge
scandalous and disparaging marks, see Lynda J. Oswald, Challenging the Registration of Scandalous and
Disparaging Marks under the Lanham Act: Who has Standing to Sue?, 42 AM. BUS. L.J. 251 (2004); Roger D. Blair
& Thomas F. Cotter, The Elusive Logic of Standing Doctrine in Intellectual Property Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1323
(2000).
49.
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petition with the TTAB on the grounds that registration was obtained contrary to
the statutory bars listed in Section 2(a)–(c) of the Lanham Act.61 A successful
cancellation petition, however, only cancels a mark’s registration on the Principal
Register; it does not necessarily invalidate the mark holder’s state or common law
rights.62
Next, the TTAB examines the appropriate evidence to determine whether the
mark should be cancelled.63 Registration on the Principal Register attaches a
presumption of validity to the challenged mark,64 and the burden of proof is on the
petitioner to overcome this presumption by a preponderance of the evidence.65 If
the petitioner meets this burden, then the burden shifts to the registrant to defend
the validity of the mark’s registration.66 If a party is dissatisfied with the decision of
the TTAB, the aggrieved party has two options. First, the decision of the TTAB may
be appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal
Circuit”) by either party to the cancellation proceeding.67 The Federal Circuit
reviews the TTAB’s decision using the record of the underlying TTAB proceeding,
and thus no new evidence is permitted in an appeal to the Federal Circuit.68 The
Supreme Court considers appeals from the Federal Circuit.69
Alternatively, the aggrieved party may institute a civil action in federal district
court.70 If the adverse parties reside in multiple federal districts not within the same
state, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia has
jurisdiction over the civil action.71 This action is both an appeal, and a new action;
thus, the parties may request additional relief and submit new evidence.72 While the
district court appeal is de novo, it is unique in that the findings of fact made by the

61. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)–(c)). This article will focus on subsection (a), the basis
for the cancellation proceedings brought against the six marks containing the term redskin(s). See infra Part
III.C–D.
62. Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[C]ancellation of a
trademark registration does not necessarily translate into abandonment of common law trademark rights.”). See
also MCCARTHY, supra note 44, at § 20:40.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1067.
64. W. Fla. Seafood, Inc. v. Jet Rests., Inc., 31 F.3d 1122, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[A] presumption of
validity attaches to a service mark registration, and the party seeking cancellation must rebut this presumption
by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
65. See Cold War Museum, Inc. v. Cold War Air Museum, Inc., 586 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
66. See id.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a).
68. Id. See also MCCARTHY, supra note 44, at § 21:16; Aktieselskabet AF 21. Nov. 2011 v. Fame Jeans Inc.,
525 F.3d 8, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“In a Federal Circuit appeal, the PTO transmits its record to the court, which
‘shall review the decision from which the appeal is taken on the record.’” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a))).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2012).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1); see Swatch AG v. Beehive Wholesale, LLC, 739 F.3d 150, 155 (4th Cir. 2014).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(4).
72. Id. § 1071(b)(3); see CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng’g, Inc., 267 F.3d 660, 673 (7th Cir. 2001).
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TTAB are afforded great weight.73 In fact, upon motion, the entire record of the
previous proceedings may be admitted as evidence.74 The district court has the
authority to grant or cancel trademark registrations and decide any related
matters.75 Appeals from the district court go to the appropriate court of appeals, and
then ultimately, to the Supreme Court.76

III. Section 2(a)
As previously discussed, cancellation proceedings may be brought at any time after
a mark’s registration on the Principal Register on the grounds that the mark violates
a statutory bar listed in Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act. Section 2(a) precludes
registration of “scandalous” or “disparag[ing]” marks.77 Both the Harjo Litigation,
and the most recent cancellation petition seeking cancellation of the Redskin(s)
marks were brought pursuant to Section 2(a).78 Thus, in order to fully understand
the most recent decision, an analysis of Section 2(a) is necessary.
Section 2(a) reads in relevant part:
No trademark . . . shall be refused registration on the principal register on
account of its nature unless it . . . [c]onsists of or comprises immoral,
deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely
suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or
national symbols, or bring them into contempt or disrepute. . . .79
Unfortunately, the legislative history of the Lanham Act does not offer much
insight as to what constitutes what is “scandalous,” “immoral,” or when a mark
may “disparage.”80 This lack of direction forced courts and the TTAB to determine
on their own what constitutes “scandalous” or “disparaging,” how scandalous or
disparaging a mark must be to bar registration, and what evidence may be reviewed
in conjunction with these inquiries.81 Most decisions prior to the Harjo Litigation
challenging marks under Section 2(a) involved accusations of scandalousness, and
73.

MCCARTHY, supra note 44, at § 21:20.
15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3).
75. See Swatch, 739 F.3d at 155.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2012).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
78. Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999), rev’d, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96
(D.D.C. 2003), remanded on alternative grounds, 415 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005), on remand, 567 F. Supp. 2d 46
(D.D.C. 2008), aff’d on laches ground, 565 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
80. See DAPHNE ZOGRAFOS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS 86, 88
(2010); Jasmine Abdel-Khalik, To Live in In-“Fame”-y: Reconceiving Scandalous Marks as Analogous to Famous
Marks, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 173, 176–77 (2007).
81. See Abdel-Khalik, supra note 80, at 176–77.
74.
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not disparagement.82 When courts eventually reviewed challenges alleging
disparagement, these decisions were guided by jurisprudence interpreting
“scandalous,” and thus, a brief look at these early challenges is helpful.
A. “Scandalous”
Early jurisprudence interpreting Section 2(a) focused mainly on challenges to
marks accused of being “scandalous” or “immoral.” One of the first decisions
examining whether a mark was “scandalous” or “immoral” and thus should be
refused registration occurred in 1938.83 The United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals84 determined that the mark “MADONNA” as a trademark for wine
was “of very doubtful propriety” and “would be scandalous and its registration
prohibited under said trade-mark act.”85 In making its decision, the court reasoned
that due to the lack of legislative history regarding the meaning of the word
scandalous, it should be given its ordinary meaning, and the court therefore looked
to dictionaries for such meaning.86 The court further noted that the mark should
also be viewed in the context of the type of goods offered under the mark.87 During
this time, “vulgar” or “sexual” marks were also denied registration for being
“scandalous” within the meaning of Section 2(a).88 These decisions established the
general framework of looking to the common meaning and definition of the term
to determine how scandalous a mark or term is, and then examining the term and

82.

See ZOGRAFOS, supra note 80, at 86, 88.
See, e.g., In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327 (C.C.P.A. 1938). Although decided eight years
before the passage of the Lanham Act, the reasoning is still followed today, as the court determined whether the
mark was “scandalous” within the meaning of § 5(a) of the Trademark Act of 1905, a predecessor to the
Lanham Act. See id. at 328.
84. This court no longer exists, as its judges and jurisdiction were transferred to the Federal Circuit in
1982. See U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (Successor to the Court of Customs Appeals), 1910-1982, FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_special_cpa.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
85. In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d at 329.
86. Id. at 328. The court also examined the dictionary meaning for the mark, “MADONNA.” Id.
87. Id. This was the first in a number of decisions denying registration of marks that used a religious name
in conjunction with certain products if such products were prohibited by, or an affront to, said religion. See In
re Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken G.M.B.H., 122 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 339 (T.T.A.B. 1959) (refusing registration of the
mark SENUSSI for cigarettes because Senussi is the name of a Muslim sect that forbids cigarettes); In re P.J.
Valckenberg, G.M.B.H., 122 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 334 (T.T.A.B. 1959) (refusing registration of the mark
MADONNA for wine, again); In re Sociedade Agricola e. Comerical Dos Vinhos Messias, S.A.R.L., 159 U.S.P.Q.
275 (T.T.A.B. 1968) (refusing registration of MESSIAS for wine because it was equivalent to Messiahs); but see
In re Waughtel, 138 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 594 (T.T.A.B. 1963) (allowing registration of AMISH for cigars after proof
that Amish allowed cigar-smoking).
88. See generally In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (affirming the refusal of
the registration of JACK-OFF as scandalous due to its vulgarity); In re Fox, 702 F.3d 633, 640 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(holding that the mark COCK SUCKER is vulgar). Decisions regarding what is and is not vulgar are quite
inconsistent and unpredictable. For a discussion of these decisions, see Abdel-Khalik, supra note 80, at 205–09.
83.
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meaning within the context of the goods and services offered. Eventually, the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals established that “whether the mark consists of or
comprises scandalous matter must be determined from the standpoint of a
substantial composite of the general public (although not necessarily a majority),
and in the context of contemporary attitudes . . . keeping in mind changes in social
mores and sensitivities[.]”89
B. Disparagement Jurisprudence
Although within the same subsection of Section 2(a) as “scandalous” and
“immoral,” disparagement represents an independent basis to challenge a registered
mark.90 In comparison to scandalous and vulgar marks, however, far fewer decisions
have examined whether marks contain “matter which may disparage or falsely
suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national
symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute[.]”91 In 1951, in one of the
earliest cases addressing disparagement, the mark “DOUGH-BOY” was denied
registration in connection with a prophylactic preparation.92 The examiner found
that the mark was disparaging in conjunction with prophylactics because
“doughboys” was a nickname given to American soldiers in WWI and the
packaging displayed a picture of an American soldier.93 Notwithstanding this
decision, few marks were challenged or reviewed for disparagement pursuant to
Section 2(a).
Many years passed without meaningful analysis of disparagement until 1988,
when the TTAB analyzed whether an applicant’s mark of a defecating dog
disparaged the plaintiff Greyhound’s dog mark.94 The TTAB adopted a two-part test
to determine whether the applicant’s mark disparaged the existing greyhound mark:
(1) [T]hat the communication reasonably would be understood as referring
to the plaintiff; and (2) that the communication is disparaging, that is,

89.

See In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d at 1340 (internal citations omitted).
MCCARTHY, supra note 44, at § 19:77.25.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
92. Doughboy Indus., Inc. v. Reese Chem. Co., 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 227 (P.T.O. 1951).
93. Id. at 227–28. This early case established the idea that the mark must be considered in connection with
the goods identified with the mark in order to examine whether a mark is disparaging. See Pro-Football, Inc. v.
Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 125 (D.D.C. 2003), remanded on alternative grounds, 415 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005), on
remand, 567 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2008), aff’d on laches ground, 565 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
94. Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635 (T.T.A.B. 1988).
90.
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would be considered offensive or objectionable by a reasonable person of
ordinary sensibilities.95
After concluding that the public would recognize the applicant’s design as referring
to the plaintiff’s design, the TTAB analyzed whether the defecating dog would be
generally offensive to “a substantial portion of the public.”96 In its analysis, the
TTAB simply looked at the proposed mark—a defecating dog—and reviewed
essentially no other evidence.97 The TTAB summarily stated that the sight of a dog
defecating as used on the applicant’s goods (t-shirts) would be offensive to a
substantial portion of the general public.98 Because the mark would be associated
with the petitioner’s mark, the TTAB concluded the mark disparaged the
petitioner’s mark and denied registration.99
The Greyhound decision did little to clarify what constitutes evidence that a mark
disparaged a group of people for the purposes of Section 2(a). However, in In re In
Over Our Heads, Inc.,100 the TTAB reviewed a mark to determine whether it
disparaged a group of people.101 The applicant sought registration of the mark
MOONIES, with the two “o”s in the mark designed to resemble naked buttocks to
be used in conjunction with dolls.102 The examiner refused registration on the basis
that “moonies” used in this manner disparaged members of the Unification
Church.103 On appeal, the TTAB referred to dictionary definitions of “moonie(s)” to
determine the meaning of the word, and found references in the dictionary to both
church members and exposing one’s buttocks.104 Since the mark was used in
conjunction with dolls that dropped their pants, however, the TTAB concluded that
the public would perceive MOONIES as referring to the act of dropping one’s
pants, and not to members of the Unification Church.105 Importantly, the
Unification Church was not opposing registration.106 Finally, the TTAB stated that:
95. Id. at 1639 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 629 (1977)). Some commentators have
criticized the TTAB’s use of the Restatement test because the Restatement was written thirty years after the
Lanham Act was passed and is inconsistent with the TTAB’s prior decisions. See Kimberly A. Pace, The
Washington Redskins Case and the Doctrine of Disparagement: How Politically Correct Must a Trademark Be?, 22
PEPP. L. REV. 7, 30 (1994).
96. Greyhound, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1640.
99. Id. at 1642.
100. 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
101. Id. at 1654–55.
102. Id. at 1653–54.
103. Id. at 1654–55. The Unification Church was founded by Sun Myung Moon and its members are
sometimes referred to as “moonies.” Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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Because the guidelines are somewhat vague and because the determination
is so highly subjective, we are inclined to resolve doubts on the issue of
whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging in favor of applicant and pass
the mark for publication with the knowledge that if a group does find the
mark to be scandalous or disparaging, an opposition proceeding can be
brought and a more complete record can be established.107
Thus, the TTAB reversed the examiner and allowed registration of the mark.108
C. The Harjo Litigation
In 1992, seven Native Americans filed a cancellation petition with the TTAB,
arguing that six trademarks109 containing the term “redskin(s)” and owned by ProFootball, Inc. (“Pro-Football”) violated the Lanham Act’s prohibition of marks that
disparaged persons or brought them into contempt or disrepute.110 The petition
represented the first opportunity for the TTAB to determine whether a mark
disparaged a racial or ethnic group.111 Importantly, the TTAB made a number of
evidentiary rulings on the specific evidence that could be considered in a Section
2(a) disparagement claim.112 Specifically, the TTAB dismissed Pro-Football’s
objections that certain evidence was outside the relevant time period, admitted the
evidence, and held that the evidence shed light on whether the term was disparaging
and that the timeliness and any other flaws simply went to the probative value of
the evidence.113
The TTAB also clarified that whether the marks at issue are disparaging is based
on the disparaging nature of the marks when the respective registrations were
issued, and not whether the marks are considered disparaging in present society.114
Furthermore, the TTAB stated that “scandalous” and “disparage” as used in Section
2(a) represented different statutory bars, holding that “scandalous” looked to

107.

Id. at 1654–55.
Id. at 1655.
109. REDSKINETTES, Registration No. 1,606,810 (July 17, 1990); REDSKINS, Registration No. 1,085,092
(Feb. 7, 1978); THE REDSKINS & DESIGN, Registration No. 987,127 (June 25, 1974); WASHINGTON
REDSKINS & DESIGN, Registration No. 986,668 (June 18, 1974); WASHINGTON REDSKINS, Registration
No. 978,824 (Feb. 12, 1974); THE REDSKINS (stylized), Registration No. 836,122 (Sept. 29, 1967).
110. Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999), rev’d, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96
(D.D.C. 2003), remanded on alternative grounds, 415 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005), on remand, 567 F. Supp. 2d 46
(D.D.C. 2008), aff’d on laches ground, 565 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
111. MCCARTHY, supra note 44, at § 19:77.25.
112. See Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1716–18 (allowing survey and expert testimony evidence, among
other evidence, to be considered).
113. Id. at 1717.
114. Id. at 1734–35.
108.

Vol. 10, No. 2 2015

279

Challenge-Flag Thrown
society as a whole,115 while “disparage” looked only to the beliefs of the identifiable
group.116 In doing so, the TTAB declared that the opinions of those individuals in
the identifiable group are the only relevant points of view as to whether the term
was disparaging.117 Thus, the TTAB developed the two-part test that became the
standard for whether a mark should be barred for being disparaging:118
(1) What is the likely meaning of the matter in question, taking into account
not only dictionary definitions, but also the relationship of the matter to
the other elements in the mark, the nature of the goods and services, and
the manner in which the mark is used in the marketplace in connection
with the goods or services; and
(2) if that meaning is found to refer to identifiable persons, institutions,
beliefs or national symbols, whether that meaning may be disparaging to
a substantial composite of the referenced group.119
After examining evidence of the term redskin(s) in connection with the
Washington Redskins football team, the TTAB concluded that the term referred to
both the football team and “carrie[d] the allusion to Native Americans inherent in
the original definition of that word.”120 The TTAB then examined whether the term
disparaged Native Americans. The TTAB concluded that based on the entire record,
the petitioners established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that redskin(s), as
used in Pro-Football’s marks in connection with its goods and services, disparaged
Native Americans as perceived by a “substantial composite” of Native Americans.121
Subsequently, Pro-Football brought a civil action in the federal district court for
the District of Columbia, seeking a de novo review pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §

115. The TTAB concluded that the registrations were not “scandalous.” Id. at 1748–49. “Scandalous” refers
to the perception by the general public, while “disparag[ing]” refers to the specific group. Id. Thus, the TTAB
concluded that the general acceptance by the general public of the continued use of redskin(s) in association
with the football team for decades demonstrated that the requisite amount of the general public did not find the
term “scandalous.” Id.
116. Id. at 1737.
117. Id. at 1740–41 (“[I]t is only logical that, in deciding whether the matter may be disparaging, we look,
not to American society as a whole . . . but to the views of the referenced group.”).
118. Id. See also In re Squaw Valley Dev. Co., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1264 (T.T.A.B. 2006); In re Heeb Media, LLC,
89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1071 (T.T.A.B. 2008); In re Lebanese Arak Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1215 (T.T.A.B. 2010).
119. Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740–41.
120. Id. at 1742.
121. Id. at 1747.
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1071(b).122 Although labeled a “de novo review,”123 the district court concluded that
the TTAB’s findings in a cancellation proceeding may only be overturned if the
party seeking reversal proves the TTAB’s decision is “unsupported by substantial
evidence.”124 Additionally, whether a mark is disparaging to the referenced group is
a question of fact, not law.125 Thus, the burden of proving that the TTAB’s findings
are unsupported by substantial evidence is borne by the party challenging the
findings.126 Ultimately, the court held that the appellate court must review the
“TTAB’s application of the legal principles to [the TTAB’s] findings of fact and [the
TTAB’s] determination that these findings demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that the trademarks at issue may disparage Native Americans.”127
First, the court determined that the TTAB correctly held that Harjo/Petitioner
needed to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that the challenged marks
disparaged Native Americans.128 Next, the court upheld the two-part test crafted by
the TTAB to determine whether a mark is disparaging, including limiting the
relevant perceptions to only those people who are part of the identifiable group.129
The court also agreed with the TTAB that the “‘question of disparagement must be
considered in relation to the goods or services identified by the mark in the context
of the marketplace.’”130 Finally, the court agreed with the TTAB that both parts of
the test are to be answered as of the dates the marks were registered.131 Although the
court reversed the TTAB’s decision on laches grounds,132 the court undertook a

122. Pro-Football, Inc., v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 100 (D.D.C. 2003). When the appeal was brought, the
default federal district court under § 1071(b) was the District of Columbia. Id. As noted previously, the Eastern
District of Virginia is now the default federal district court. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
123. The review is “de novo” only insofar as new evidence may be introduced, but unlike a true de novo
proceeding, the TTAB’s findings of facts are given great weight. Pro-Football, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 115 n.18.
124. Id. at 114 (citing the standard of review set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706).
See also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 151 (1999); Mazzari v. Rogan, 323 F.3d 1000, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Harjo advocated that the court adopt a “clearly erroneous” standard of review. Pro-Football, 284 F. Supp. 2d at
114.
125. Pro-Football, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 117. The court reiterated, however, that the court reviews de novo the
question of whether the legal standard applied by the TTAB is the appropriate standard. Id. at 118 (“[The
TTAB’s] findings of fact . . . are reviewed under the substantial evidence test. The Court then turns its attention
the legal principles adopted by the TTAB to help it resolve this case. The court reviews the TTAB’s legal
principles de novo.”).
126. Id. at 117–18 (citing Trans Union Corp. v. F.T.C., 245 F.3d 809, 814–15 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
127. Id. at 118.
128. Id. at 122. Pro-Football had argued that the “clear and convincing evidence” standard should be
applied. Id.
129. Id. at 124–25.
130. Id. at 125.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 139. Laches is not an issue in the current litigation and will not be discussed in any detail.
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detailed analysis of the evidence, and its analysis needs to be discussed as it greatly
informs the current litigation.
Despite affirming the TTAB’s test for disparagement, the court ultimately
concluded that the TTAB’s holding that the marks disparaged Native Americans
was unsupported by substantial evidence.133 The court held that the TTAB’s
determination of the first question of the test, (namely, that for the relevant time
period the meaning of the term redskin(s) was a Native American person, even as
used in connection with the goods and services) was supported by substantial
evidence.134
However, with regards to the second question of the test, the court concluded
that “the TTAB’s conclusion that the six trademarks may disparage Native
Americans is not supported by substantial evidence.”135 The court began by stating
that the TTAB’s decision “is logically flawed, and fails to apply the correct legal
standard to its own findings of fact.”136 The court noted that none of the linguistic
evidence directly proved that the marks were disparaging when used in connection
with the football club at the relevant times.137 The court also found that the Ross
Survey evidence relied on by the TTAB was not relevant evidence because it was
taken in 1996, included people that were not even born in 1967, and thus revealed
nothing about the attitudes of Native Americans during the relevant time period.138
Furthermore, the Ross Survey did not ask about the use of the term redskin(s) in
connection with the football team.139
Outside the Ross Survey evidence, which according to the court was not relevant,
only the testimony of the seven Native Americans who brought suit was introduced
as evidence, and the court concluded that these seven could not possibly constitute
a substantial composite of Native Americans.140 The dictionary evidence the TTAB
relied upon to conclude that the term redskin was disparaging was also
unsupported by substantial evidence, according to the court.141 The court also

133. Id. at 125–26. (“[T]he TTAB’s finding that the marks at issue ‘may disparage’ Native Americans is
unsupported by substantial evidence, is logically flawed, and fails to apply the correct legal standard to its own
findings of fact.”).
134. Id. at 126. The court agreed with the TTAB that Pro-Football’s trademarks, even though used in
connection with a football team, consistently used Native American imagery and thus “redskin(s)” had not lost
its meaning as a reference to Native Americans. Id. at 127.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 126.
137. Id. at 127.
138. Id. at 132–33.
139. Id. at 132.
140. Id. at 129.
141. Id. at 130–31 (noting that half of the dictionaries submitted listed redskin as derogatory or offensive
but this was not relevant evidence, as it merely demonstrated what the general population may think, and not
the relevant group, Native Americans).
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dismissed the newspaper articles and resolutions from the relevant time periods
from Native American individuals and groups protesting the use of the name,
because this evidence, on its own, did not necessarily reflect the views of a
substantial composite of Native Americans.142 In essence, the court determined that
nearly every piece of evidence that the TTAB had relied upon was not relevant,
either because it was not from the relevant time period, or because it reflected the
view of the general public, and not the relevant group. As a result, the court
concluded that the TTAB’s conclusion that the marks were disparaging to Native
American was unsupported by substantial evidence.143
Harjo appealed the district court’s decision to the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia.144 In a per curiam opinion that addressed only the narrow
laches issue, the court of appeals reversed the district court’s holding that the
cancellation proceeding was barred by laches and remanded the proceeding to the
district court for the narrow purpose of evaluating whether laches barred one
party’s claim.145 The Court of Appeals did not address or disturb the district court’s
findings concerning the disparagement. On remand, the district court reviewed
laches as to one party’s claim and concluded that laches indeed barred his claim.146
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision.147
D. Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc.
While the Harjo Litigation was ongoing, five Native Americans filed a cancellation
petition (the “Blackhorse Litigation”) seeking cancellation of the same six
trademarks containing the term redskin(s) on the grounds that the marks were
disparaging to Native Americans and thus barred from registration.148 The
cancellation petition was stayed pending resolution of the Harjo Litigation, but
when the Harjo Litigation was resolved on laches grounds, the ultimate issue of
whether the marks were barred from registration under Section 2(a) of the Lanham
Act remained unresolved, and the cancellation proceedings continued.149 The
Blackhorse Litigation culminated in the TTAB’s cancellation of all six marks on the

142.

Id. at 135–36.
Id. at 136.
144. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 415 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005), on remand, 567 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2008),
aff’d on laches ground, 565 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
145. Id. at 50.
146. Pro-Football, Inc., v. Harjo, 567 F. Supp. 2d 46, 62 (D.D.C. 2008), aff’d on laches ground, 565 F.3d 880
(D.C. Cir. 2009).
147. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565 F.3d 880, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
148. Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080, 2014 WL 2757516 (T.T.A.B June 18,
2014).
149. See id. at *6 (“Thus, the D.C. Circuit resolved the case solely on the issue of laches, never addressing the
Board’s finding of disparagement on the merits.”).
143.
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grounds that the term redskin(s), as used in connection with the goods and services
offered under the marks, is disparaging to Native Americans.150
In 2011, both parties stipulated that the entire record of the Harjo Litigation may
be submitted into evidence,151 provided however, that the parties did not stipulate
that any particular evidence from the Harjo Litigation was relevant to the
Blackhorse Litigation,152 and therefore both parties could object to any evidence
introduced from the Harjo Litigation on that basis.153
First, the TTAB adopted the two-part test laid out in the Harjo Litigation to
determine disparagement:
(a) What is the meaning of the matter in question, as it appears in the
marks and as those marks are used in connection with the goods and
services identified in the registrations?
(b) Is the meaning of the marks one that may disparage Native
Americans?154
Again, the TTAB stressed that these questions are to be resolved according to the
views existing at the time of the respective registration dates, and only with respect
to the views of the referenced group, Native Americans.155 Finally, the TTAB
reiterated that a “substantial composite” of the referenced group must find the
mark as used disparaging.156
The TTAB began by noting that its decision did not rely on the Ross Survey, a
key piece of evidence in the Harjo Litigation deemed irrelevant by the district
court.157 Like the previous TTAB and the district court in the Harjo Litigation, the
TTAB held that the evidence overwhelmingly supported the determination that
redskin(s), as used in the marks at issue, retains the meaning Native American.158 In
coming to this conclusion, the TTAB reviewed evidence from the relevant time
periods, showing Native American imagery used by Pro-Football to promote the
Redskins football team.159 The TTAB concluded that redskin(s) used in connection
150.
151.

Id. at *72.
Id. at *3. The only exception was the deposition testimony of the petitioners in the Harjo Litigation. Id.

at *5.
152. This was an important stipulation, as the TTAB rejected Pro-Football’s hearsay and other objections to
certain evidence without examination, citing this stipulation as the basis. See id. at *17.
153. Id.
154. Id. at *4 (citing Pro-Football v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 125–26 (D.D.C. 2003)).
155. Id. at *9.
156. Id. at *10.
157. Id. at *5.
158. Id. at *9.
159. Id. at *8. The TTAB also cited the district court’s identical conclusion on this point. Id.
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with the football team retained its “‘core meaning’ identifying a ‘race of
people[.]’”160
The TTAB then turned to the second prong of the test: whether the term
redskin(s) was disparaging to a substantial composite of Native Americans in the
context of the goods and services.161 The TTAB clarified that a substantial composite
does not necessarily mean the majority.162 In terms of the good and services, the
TTAB elucidated that the context of the goods and services may do one of three
things.163 First, the context may turn a non-disparaging term into a disparaging
one.164 Second, the context may turn a potentially disparaging term into a nondisparaging term.165 And third, the context may have no effect on a term’s
disparaging meaning.166
Both parties conceded that the term redskin(s) means Native American even
when used in conjunction with the football team.167 Thus, the TTAB determined
that redskins fell into category three, i.e., that the
alleged honorable intent and manner of use of the term do not contribute to
the determination of whether a substantial composite of the referenced
group found REDSKINS to be a disparaging term in the context of [ProFootball’s] services during the time period 1967–1990, because the services
have not removed the Native American meaning from the term and intent
does not affect the second prong.168
Thus, the only question was whether redskin(s) was disparaging at the time of the
respective registrations.169
The TTAB grouped the petitioners’ evidence into two categories: (1) general

160.

Id. at *11 n.50.
Id. at *9.
162. Id. at *5 (citing In re Heeb Media LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1071, 1074 (T.T.A.B. 2008); In re Squaw Valley
Dev. Co., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1264, 1279 n.12 (T.T.A.B. 2006); Ritchie v. Simpson, 179 F.3d 1091, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d
1023, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
163. Id. at *9.
164. Id. (citing In re Lebanese Arak Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1215, 1223 (T.T.A.B. 2010) (holding that the term
KHORAN, while not otherwise disparaging, disparages religion and beliefs of Muslim Americans when used for
wine)).
165. Id. (citing In re Squaw Valley, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1267 (holding that SQUAW in relation to ski
equipment means only the geographic location and did not mean Native American women)).
166. Id. (citing In re Heeb, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1077 (finding that the term HEEB in the context of goods and
services is disparaging, regardless of the applicant’s good intent and inoffensive goods)).
167. Id. at *9.
168. Id. at *10.
169. Id.
161.
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analysis of the term redskin(s); and (2) specific views of the referenced group.170 The
TTAB focused particularly on expert testimony, dictionary definitions, and
reference books in the first category.171 The TTAB placed emphasis on the decreased
media usage of the term, and the corresponding increase in labels such as
“offensive” or “derogatory” added to the dictionaries’ definitions of redskin(s)
throughout the relevant time period.172
In the second category, the petitioners’ main piece of evidence was the NCAI
Resolution (“the Resolution”).173 Pro-Football argued that the Resolution was
irrelevant because it was not passed during the pertinent time period.174 The TTAB
rejected this argument, finding that the “mere fact that an opinion is voiced in 1993
does not mean the opinion was not held by that group or individual in the 1967–
1990 time period.”175 The TTAB placed great weight on the NCAI Resolution and
stated that the Resolution “throughout the relevant time period represented
approximately thirty percent of Native Americans[.]”176 If individual testimony
about past-held views is acceptable, the TTAB continued, then group statements
about past-held views are also relevant.177 The TTAB then addressed the letters
written by various chiefs and Native American communities that disagreed that the
term redskin(s) was offensive in connection with the football team, although the
TTAB spent considerably less time noting this evidence.178
After discussing the relevant evidence, the TTAB made thirty-nine separate
findings of fact.179 Initially, the TTAB found that the word redskin(s) is and always
has been a racial designation that refers to the skin color of Native Americans.180 The
TTAB also noted that before 1966, dictionaries included no usage label for the
redskin(s) entry, but beginning in 1966, and continuing through 1990, dictionaries
began including usage labels that the term was offensive and disparaging.181 The
remaining findings of fact concluded that the NCAI represented the views of a great
number of Native American tribes, and that their respective members and the

170.

Id.
Id.
172. Id. at *11–16.
173. Id. at *17. The court also considered depositions, newspaper articles, reports, official records, and
letters in the second category. Id. at *18–25.
174. Id. at *18.
175. Id.
176. Id. (emphasis added).
177. Id. The TTAB also cited excerpts from letters and newspapers from the relevant time period to support
its conclusion that the representation numbers were accurate. Id. at *18 n.117.
178. Id. at *22–23.
179. Id. at *25–28. This was likely in response to the district court’s criticism in the Harjo Litigation that the
TTAB had made few findings of fact.
180. Id. at *25.
181. Id. at *26.
171.
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NCAI had been opposed to the name of the team during the respective time
period.182 Focusing on the NCAI Resolution, the TTAB found that “at a minimum
approximately thirty percent of Native Americans found the term [redskin(s)] used
in connection with [Pro-Football’s] services to be disparaging” in the relevant time
period, and furthermore, that thirty percent is “without a doubt a substantial
composite.”183 It also noted that the existence of Native Americans who hold an
opposing view does not change the conclusion that a substantial composite find the
term disparaging and thus, in a 2-1 vote, the TTAB concluded that the trademarks
should be cancelled.184

IV. Likelihood of Reversal in the Current Action185
Soon after the TTAB issued its decision, Pro-Football filed suit in the federal
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia seeking to have the decision
overturned.186 The narrow legal question determined by the TTAB was whether the
evidence establishes that the term “redskin(s)” was disparaging to a substantial
composite of Native Americans, in connection with football-related services, at the
time each of the challenged registrations were issued. As discussed above, the six
registrations were issued between 1967 and 1990. Thus, the Blackhorse petitioners
needed to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a substantial
composite of Native Americans found the marks disparaging in 1967, 1974, 1978,
and 1990.187 The question in this action will likely be whether the TTAB’s decision
to cancel the trademarks is unsupported by substantial evidence, otherwise known
as the substantial evidence test.188

182.

See id. at *26–28.
Id. at *29.
184. Id. Judge Bergsman wrote a dissent, in which he noted that the record was essentially the same as the
record when the district court reversed the cancellation in the original Harjo decision. Id. at *35 (Bergsman, J.,
dissenting). The views in the dissent will be more thoroughly presented in Section IV. See infra Part IV.
185. As of this writing, some preliminary motions have been filed. Blackhorse filed a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, alleging that Pro-Football sued the wrong party. Defs’ Mot. to Dismiss, Sept. 22, 2014,
ECF 18. Although a novel argument, this motion was dismissed by the judge in its entirety. Order on Mot. to
Dismiss, Nov. 25, 2014, ECF 40.
186. As previously noted, any party disagreeing with the TTAB’s decision may appeal to the Federal Circuit,
or conversely, may file a suit in the relevant federal district court. See supra notes 67–75 and accompanying
text. This makes strategic sense for Pro-Football, as the district court review allows the introduction of new
evidence. Although reviewed de novo, the district court may only overturn the TTAB’s decision if it is
unsupported by substantial evidence. Granted, the district court could also determine that the TTAB’s legal
framework was incorrect, but this is highly unlikely as the two-prong test used by the TTAB has been adopted
by the Federal Circuit.
187. See Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080, 2014 WL 2757516, at *29 (T.T.A.B. June
18, 2014).
188. Pro-Football’s complaint also raises a number of other issues, but for the purposes of this Article, only
the main issue, whether the marks are disparaging, shall be addressed. Pro-Football also argues that the
183.

Vol. 10, No. 2 2015

287

Challenge-Flag Thrown
The petitioners made the strategic decision to submit the entire Harjo
evidentiary record, and augmented this record with some additional deposition
testimony along with evidence the dissent regarded, “charitably,” as “a database
dump.”189 In the Harjo Litigation, the D.C. Circuit reviewed nearly identical
evidence, and determined that the evidence was insufficient to support the claim of
disparagement.190 Even though this district court opinion is not precedential, it is
persuasive, and will likely be considered by the Eastern District of Virginia.
Additionally, because the evidence is nearly identical, the Eastern District of
Virginia could very well come to the same conclusion, unless petitioners produce
new evidence not submitted to the TTAB below.
An examination of the major pieces of evidence relied on by the petitioners in
the Blackhorse Litigation, the original district court’s opinion, and the dissenting
opinion of Judge Bergsman reveals that the Blackhorse petitioners may not have
proven by a preponderance of evidence that the Redskins’ marks are disparaging
and therefore, the TTAB decision to cancel the marks is unsupported by substantial
evidence.191 As such, and similar to the initial Harjo Litigation, the TTAB’s decision
to cancel the marks will likely be reversed, especially if the Blackhorse petitioners do
not submit additional evidence, and the Eastern District is persuaded by the
reasoning used in the original D.C. Circuit decision.
A. The Dictionary Evidence Offered is Inconclusive
Petitioners submitted several dictionary definitions to support the proposition that
the term redskin(s) was a disparaging term for Native Americans.192 The TTAB
concluded that the usage labels attached by these dictionaries demonstrated that the
term redskin(s) was “offensive, disparaging, contemptuous or not preferred.”193
The majority’s reliance on the dictionary evidence is problematic for a number
of reasons. For one, dictionaries show the viewpoint of dictionary editors and
perhaps society as a whole, but not Native Americans, the relevant group.194
“substantial evidence” standard is not applicable as it is a de novo review. See Pl.’s Compl. 16, Aug. 8, 2014, ECF
No. 1. However, as discussed previously in this Article, although it is called a de novo review, that name is a bit
of a misnomer. The law applied by the TTAB will be reviewed de novo, while the TTAB’s findings of fact will be
reviewed under the substantial evidence test.
189. Blackhorse, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA), 2014 WL 2757516, at *36 (Bergsman, J., dissenting).
190. See Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 136 (D.D.C. 2003).
191. See infra Part IV.A–D.
192. Blackhorse, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA), 2014 WL 2757516, at *12 (majority opinion).
193. Id. at *27.
194. See, e.g., id. at *12 (noting that Mr. Barnhart, an expert lexicographer, testified that usage labels are a
“‘[r]eflection of the opinion of the editor in chief”); The OED and Oxford Dictionaries, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, http://public.oed.com/about/the-oed-and-oxford-dictionaries/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2015)
(explaining that the dictionary content in Oxford Dictionaries focuses on current English and includes modern
meanings and uses of words).
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Additionally, some of the definitions provided were from outside of the relevant
time frame of the dates of registration of the marks.195 As Pro-Football’s expert
argued, the restrictive usage labels within the dictionary definitions leave open the
interpretation of the term redskin(s), and do not conclusively establish its
interpretation.196 Thus, the weight the TTAB majority places upon the dictionary
evidence is too great and fails to show that the term redskin(s) was disparaging to
Native Americans in the context of football related services.
Prior to 1965, the TTAB noted, there was no evidence of restrictive usage labels
for the term redskin in dictionaries.197 The TTAB stated that there was a clear trend
toward employing the terms “offensive” and “disparaging” in dictionary usage
labels after 1966.198 The record evidence, however, demonstrated that only two
dictionaries before 1980 showed such labels.199 At the time THE REDSKINS
(stylized) mark was registered in 1967, there was only one dictionary with a usage
label stating that the word redskin was “often offensive.”200 The dictionary
definitions offered after 1980 were from 1980, 1987, and 1989, arguably not during
the relevant time period for five of the registered marks.201 The dictionary
definitions cited used the restrictive label “often offensive” or “often disparaging
and offensive.”202 The key word is “often.” “Often” implies that there are
circumstances in which redskin(s) is not offensive.203 Since it is not “always”
offensive, it can be argued that redskin(s) as used in connection with football
related activities, is not offensive or disparaging. Additionally, the linguistic experts
did not specifically research the Native American viewpoint of the word redskin in
connection with football-related services during any time period.204
Further, linguistic experts testified that the adoption of usage labels by dictionary
editors is a reflection of the opinion of the editor-in-chief, but some editors are
influenced by non-editorial sources.205 Sociopolitical groups, such as sociologists,
historians, and anthropologists, can influence editors to adopt a usage label.206
However, presumably the experts themselves are not all Native American, nor are

195.

See Blackhorse, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA), 2014 WL 2757516, at *12.
Id. at *13.
197. Id. at *12.
198. See id. The TTAB determined that there was no difference between “offensive” and “disparaging” for
the purpose of analyzing dictionary definitions. Id. at *13.
199. See id. at *12.
200. Id. at *38 (Bergsman, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at *12 (majority opinion). Five of the marks were registered from 1967–1978. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at *38 (Bergsman, J., dissenting). “Often” means “many times” or “frequently,” but not always. See
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 862 (11th ed. 2004).
204. Blackhorse, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA), 2014 WL 2757516, at *10 n.49 (majority opinion).
205. Id. at *12, *26 n.184.
206. See id. at *13.
196.
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the dictionary editors and publishers, or the sociologists, historians, or
anthropologists, as pointed out by Judge Bergsman in his dissent.207 Therefore, the
usage labels reflect the perception of dictionary editors and publishers and society
as a whole, not Native Americans, the only group whose opinion is relevant.
As stated in the dissent, the evidence does not support the finding of fact No. 7,
that “beginning in 1966 and continuing to 1990, usage labels in dictionaries
indicating the term REDSKINS to be offensive, disparaging, contemptuous or not
preferred appear and grow in number” as applied to the marks registered from
1967–1978.208
B. The NCAI Resolution is Outside the Relevant Time Frame and is not Evidence of the
Opinion of a Substantial Composite of Native Americans
As addressed in the Eastern District of Virginia complaint and the TTAB dissent,
the NCAI Resolution, which purports to provide the view of Native Americans held
at the relevant time period, is not supported by reliable evidence as to the number
of Native Americans who attended the meeting or that were members of the
organization during the relevant time frame.209 In the Harjo Litigation, the district
court disregarded the same evidence for the same problems noting: “All of these
resolutions were made after the relevant time frame, with no explanation by the
TTAB as to how they ‘shed light’ on the relevant time period, and thus, are
irrelevant to the calculus.”210
The NCAI Resolution was passed in 1993; three years outside of the relevant
time frame for the most recently registered mark at issue.211 The TTAB determined
that the NCAI Resolution was probative of the view Native Americans held during
the relevant time period because the NCAI represented approximately 30% of
Native Americans.212 The TTAB also placed great emphasis on the Resolution
language, which stated that it represented the “past and ongoing viewpoint of the
Native Americans it represents[.]”213 However, there is no evidence in the record of
the number of Native Americans or tribes that attended the meeting or any
membership information for the necessary time period.214 The phrase “past and
ongoing viewpoint[s]” is broad and undefined. Without determining how far into

207.

See id. at *36 (Bergsman, J., dissenting).
Id. at *39.
209. Id. at *40.
210. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 135 (D.D.C. 2003) aff’d on other grounds, 565 F.3d 880
(D.C. Cir. 2009).
211. See Blackhorse, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA), 2014 WL 2757516, at *17 (majority opinion).
212. Id. at *18.
213. Id.
214. Id. at *40 (Bergsman, J., dissenting). The evidence from newspaper stories is also not very compelling
since it is double hearsay. See id. at *6 n.21 (majority opinion).
208.
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the past the opinions go, it is difficult to apply the evidence to ascertain the opinion
of Native Americans during 1974, 1976, 1978, and 1990.
Just as importantly, the TTAB determined that the 1993 resolution represented
the views of 30% of the Native American population.215 This is a broad leap from
the facts of record. The TTAB concluded from scant evidence that the NCAI
member tribes comprised 30% of the Native American population in 1993.216 The
TTAB dismissed evidence that NCAI resolutions may come to a vote with only a
quorum present.217 Per NCAI rules, only one-third of tribes, through their
appointed representative, need to be present to establish a quorum, and then only a
majority vote of the one-third in attendance is required to pass a resolution.218 There
is no evidence in the record of which tribes were present or how many tribes voted.
Examining this issue closer, the petitioners submitted evidence that the NCAI
represented 150 tribes, representing thirty percent of the total Native American
population, when the Resolution passed.219 Thus, at a maximum, if all 150 tribes
were present when the Resolution passed, and all 150 tribes voted yes, then the
Resolution may have represented thirty percent of the Native American population.
The TTAB summarily accepts that this statistically improbable maximum number
is the correct number.220 In contrast, due to the NCAI quorum rules, at a minimum,
the Resolution could have been passed if a majority of one-third of the member
tribes were present and voted yes, or 26 tribes.221 Furthermore, only a single
representative of the tribe is required to vote for the entire tribe.222 Depending on
the respective populations of the tribes present and voting yes, this vote could
actually represent a very small percentage of Native Americans.
Testimony offered to support the NCAI Resolution also falls short. JoAnn Chase,
the Executive Director of the NCAI, testified about the NCAI Resolution, but she
did not become the Executive Director until 1994.223 She testified that she was not at
the meeting when the Resolution was passed, she was not aware of any meeting
minutes, she was not aware of whether a quorum was present for voting, and had
no record of the people in attendance.224 Additionally, she did not know what the
membership of the organization was at the time of the NCAI Resolution and could

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at *18.
Id.
Id. at *40 (Bergsman, J., dissenting).
Id. at *26–27 (majority opinion).
Id. at *17.
See id. at *26–27 (accepting Chase’s testimony and therefore accepting the calculations).
See id. at *26.
Id.
Id. (“Since 1994, Jo Ann Chase has been the Executive Director of the NCAI.”).
Id. at *40 (Bergsman, J., dissenting).
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not identify the number of tribe members.225 Even though Chase could not identify
membership numbers, the TTAB found, from her testimony, that “there were
between 100–400 members at the time the resolution was taken.”226
To support the Board’s findings that “approximately 150 tribes were members
[of the NCAI] in 1993” and that “[t]he NCAI members throughout the time period
represent approximately 30 percent of Native Americans,”227 evidence was offered
that again, is unsubstantiated. For example, a letter in 1991 from Dale Pullen,
publisher of the U.S. Congress Handbook, to Charlie Drayton, the VP of
Communications for the Washington Redskins football team, states that, “[t]he
National Congress of American Indians represent [sic] Indians living on
reservations (the remaining 30 percent).”228 Since this evidence is not coming
directly from the NCAI, it is difficult to prove its accuracy. The majority also relies
on a statement made by Dr. Britton Harwood from minutes of the Miami
University Senate that the NCAI represented approximately 150 tribal
governments.229 However, the minutes are not supported by evidence that identifies
Dr. Harwood, how he is knowledgeable about the membership of the NCAI, or the
source used to quantify the membership. Without this information, the minutes
merely are probative of his beliefs.230
The TTAB majority too easily dismisses these shortcomings in the NCAI
Resolution evidence. These shortcomings were laid out by both the TTAB dissent,
and the District Court of Columbia in the original proceeding.231 Most importantly,
the Eastern District must accept, as the TTAB did, that although the NCAI
Resolution was passed outside the relevant time period, it still represents the view
held by Native Americans during the relevant time period.232 If the Eastern District
of Virginia agrees with the original D.C. Circuit decision, and concludes that the
NCAI Resolution is not relevant evidence or should not be given the weight it was
given by the TTAB, it is far more likely that the Eastern District will determine that
the TTAB decision was unsupported by substantial evidence, as the NCAI
Resolution was the cornerstone of the TTAB’s analysis.

225.

Id.
Id. at *21 (majority opinion).
227. Id. at *27, *28.
228. Id. at *21.
229. Id.
230. See id. at 41 (Bergsman, J., dissenting).
231. See id. at *36–43; Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 121 (D.D.C. 2003) aff’d on other
grounds, 565 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
232. See Blackhorse, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA), 2014 WL 2757516, at *18 (majority opinion).
226.
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C. “Substantial Composite” Needs to be Defined
Even if the NCAI Resolution can be substantiated to represent 30% of Native
Americans, is 30% a “substantial composite” of Native Americans? The TTAB
concluded that the relevant group for assessing whether a mark is disparaging is a
“substantial composite” of Native Americans, but failed to define the term.233
Petitioners did not introduce any evidence regarding the Native American
population as a whole during the relevant time frame, nor did they provide any
argument as to what comprises a substantial composite of that population. Without
this important information, it is nearly impossible to evaluate the meaning of the
evidence submitted.234
Further, the finding by the TTAB that 30% of the Native American population
constituted a “substantial composite” conflicts with the findings in the Harjo
decision, namely, that 36.6% of the Native American population amounted to a
“substantial composite.”235 Considering the TTAB was evaluating nearly identical
evidence, this finding may not withstand further scrutiny. In the current action, the
term “substantial composite” will need to be defined for the Eastern District to
determine the sufficiency of the evidence submitted by the petitioners.
D. Evidentiary Standard and TTAB Precedent
In inter partes proceedings before the TTAB, disparagement under Section 2(a) of
the Lanham Act must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.236 Since Harjo,
the TTAB has issued two recent decisions denying registration of two trademark
applications as disparaging—In re Heeb Media237 and In re Geller.238 In these cases,
the TTAB ruled that the marks were disparaging based on the opinion of a few
group representatives “without seriously scrutinizing the representative capacity of
those individuals or requiring a strict mathematical calculation of the number of
persons whose behalf they purportedly were speaking.”239 These opinions were
determined to represent a substantial composite of the relevant group.240 However,
the Heeb and Geller cases were ex parte cases in which a lower standard of proof is

233.

See id. at *5, *29.
Id. at *36 (Bergsman, J., dissenting).
235. See Pro-Football, Inc., v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 133 n.32 (D.D.C. 2003).
236. See supra Part II.C.
237. In re Heeb Media, LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1071, 1080 (T.T.A.B. 2008).
238. In re Geller, 2013 WL 2365001, at *11 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 7, 2013).
239. Patricia Cotton, Redskins Ruling is Consistent with TTAB Precedent, LAW360 (July 29, 2014, 10:37 AM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/561283/redskins-ruling-is-consistent-with-ttab-precedent (arguing that the
TTAB’s decision was actually consistent with its recent rulings, yet recognizing that the inter partes nature of the
Blackhorse Litigation may require heightened scrutiny).
240. See In re Heeb Media, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1079; In re Geller, 2013 WL 2365001, at *10.
234.
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required.241 In an inter partes proceeding, the standard is much higher: a
preponderance of the evidence.242 Meaning, the Blackhorse petitioners needed to
prove disparagement by a preponderance of the evidence.243

V. Conclusion
The burden for the Blackhorse petitioners was to demonstrate by a preponderance
of the evidence that the term redskin(s), as used in connection with football-related
services, is perceived as disparaging by a substantial composite of Native Americans
during the relevant time period. According to the TTAB majority, the petitioners
met this burden.244 However, in its decision, the TTAB reached similar conclusions,
by analyzing nearly identical evidence as the TTAB in the initial Harjo Litigation.245
And despite the numerous findings of fact, the evidence upon which these findings
are based suffers from the same problems, inconsistencies, and shortcomings as it
did in the Harjo Litigation. In the Harjo Litigation, these shortcomings were
exposed by the opinion of the D.C. Circuit.246 In the most recent TTAB decision, the
dissent reiterated these same problems.247
The D.C. Circuit’s decision, although not precedential, is persuasive,248 and will
likely be considered by the Eastern District. The Eastern District may also consider
the well-reasoned dissent. In sum, the lack of direct evidence from the relevant time
period, and the overreliance by the petitioners on the NCAI Resolution, which will
be deemed irrelevant if the D.C. Circuit’s original reasoning is followed by the
Eastern District, weighs in favor of reversal of the TTAB’s decision, and ultimately
in favor of the Washington Redskins. Even if the substantial evidence test is indeed
used, the deference that must be given to the TTAB’s findings of fact under such a
standard will probably not be enough to overcome the evidentiary deficiencies.

241. See In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (requiring only substantial evidence when
affirming the TTAB’s decision); In re Heeb Media, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1077 (“In evaluating the examining
attorney’s evidence we must be cognizant of the USPTO’s limitations in amassing evidence and ‘we look only
for substantial evidence, or more than a scintilla of evidence, in support of the PTO’s prima facie
case.’”(internal citations omitted)).
242. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2012) (“In an inter partes review instituted under this chapter, the petitioner
shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
243. See Cotton, supra note 239.
244. See supra Part III.D.
245. See supra Part III.D.
246. See Pro-Football v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 130–36 (2003) (reviewing the dictionary, historical, and
survey evidence and finding insufficient evidence on record).
247. See Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080, 2014 WL 2757516, at *35–43
(T.T.A.B. June 18, 2014) (Bergsman, J., dissenting). Judge Bergsman pointed out that the dictionary evidence
relied upon by the majority was inconclusive and that there was insufficient evidence to “corroborate the
membership of the National Council of American Indians.” Id. at *35.
248. See supra Part IV.
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It is also important to understand that the cancellation of the federal trademarks
does not preclude use of the trademarks, and the Washington football team can
continue to operate under their current name and logos.249 The Redskins have used
the marks in commerce for many years, some as early as the 1930’s, and have
acquired common law trademark rights that remain enforceable regardless of the
outcome of the current action.250 Enforcing common law trademarks will be more
challenging, and without the enumerated benefits of federal registration, there
certainly will be a financial hit, but the Redskins will be able to use the marks just as
they had prior to cancellation.251
Administrative Trademark Judge Bergsman summed it up nicely by saying in his
dissenting opinion:
To be clear, this case is not about the controversy, currently playing out in
the media, over whether the term “redskins,” as the name of Washington’s
professional football team, is disparaging to Native Americans today. . . .
[The narrower legal question is] whether the evidence made of record in this
case establishes that the term “redskins” was disparaging to a substantial
composite of Native Americans at the time each of the challenged
registrations issued.252
Even though the opinion of the media and general public is irrelevant to the
trademark analysis, it is the court of public opinion that may ultimately determine
whether the team changes its name. Recently, President Obama and 50 senators
called for the team to change its name.253 Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (DNev.) has been the most vocal, recently stating he would not attend a Redskins
game until the team changed its name.254 A long list of journalists and publications

249. See Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[C]ancellation of
a trademark registration does not necessarily translate into abandonment of common law trademark rights.”);
see also MCCARTHY, supra note 44, at § 20:40.
250. See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) (“The right to adopt and use a symbol or device to
distinguish the goods or property made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by all
other persons, has long been recognized by the common law. . . . This exclusive right was not created by the act
of Congress, and does not now depend upon it for its enforcement.”); see also Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit
Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 372 (1st Cir. 1980) (“[F]ederal registration does not create the underlying right in a
trademark. That right, which accrues from the use of a particular name or symbol, is essentially a common law
property right.”).
251. See supra Part II.C.
252. Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080, 2014 WL 2757516, at *35 (T.T.A.B. June
18, 2014) (Bergsman, J., dissenting).
253. Donna Cassata, Harry Reid Won’t Attend a Redskins Game Until the Team Changes its Name,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 16, 2014, 6:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/16/harry-reid-redskins_
n_5501293.html.
254. Id.
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refuse to use the name “Redskins” including The Washington Post, New York Daily
News, San Francisco Chronicle, Slate, and The New Republic.255 Even though Dan
Snyder remains adamant that he has no intention of changing the name, if the tide
of public opinion continues in opposition to the name, the fans and sponsors may
have the ultimate say: with their wallets.

255. Andrew Beaujon, Here’s a List of Journalists Who Won’t Use the Name ‘Redskins’, POYNTER (June 19,
2014, 11:30 AM), http://www.poynter.org/news/mediawire/256258/heres-a-list-of-outlets-and-journalists-whowont-use-the-name-redskins/.
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